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A B S T R A C T
The hippocampus is believed to be important for rapid learning of arbitrary stimulus-response contingencies, or
S-R bindings. In support of this, Schnyer et al. (2006) (Experiment 2) measured priming of reaction times (RTs)
to categorise visual objects, and found that patients with medial temporal lobe damage, unlike healthy controls,
failed to show evidence of reduced priming when response contingencies were reversed between initial and
repeated categorisation of objects (a signature of S-R bindings). We ran a similar though extended object clas-
siﬁcation task on 6 patients who appear to have selective hippocampal lesions, together with 24 age-matched
controls. Unlike Schnyer et al. (2006), we found that reversing response contingencies abolished priming in both
controls and patients. Bayes Factors provided no reason to believe that response reversal had less eﬀect on
patients than controls. We therefore conclude that it is unlikely that the hippocampus is needed for S-R bindings.
1. Introduction
The medial temporal lobes (MTL), and hippocampus in particular,
are thought necessary for rapid acquisition of new associations (Squire,
1992; Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1994; Schacter and Tulving, 1994;
Giovanello et al., 2004). On the other hand, such MTL regions do not
appear necessary for all types of rapid plasticity, such as that presumed
to underlie phenomena like priming, which can also occur after a single
exposure to a stimulus (e.g., Cave and Squire, 1992; Schacter et al.,
1993). Priming is often measured by decreases in the reaction time (RT)
to perform a simple classiﬁcation task on a stimulus, such as deciding
whether the object depicted by a picture is large or small in real life.
Such RT priming has often been associated with facilitated perceptual
or conceptual processing, occurring in cortical regions outside the MTL
(Moscovitch, 1994).
However, recent studies have shown that the dominant cause of
such classiﬁcation-based RT priming is the encoding and retrieval of
Stimulus-Response (S-R) bindings (see Henson et al., 2014, for a recent
review). According to this account, the response made to the ﬁrst
presentation of a stimulus is bound together with that stimulus, such
that when that stimulus is repeated, the response can be retrieved. This
retrieval of a previous response is assumed to be faster than repeating
the original perceptual/conceptual processing that generated the
response on the initial stimulus presentation, causing the RT priming.
However, if the task changes between initial and repeated presenta-
tions, such that the response is changed, the amount of RT priming is
reduced. Indeed, sometimes priming is abolished by a response re-
versal, or even becomes negative, i.e, slower RTs for repeated than
novel stimuli, possibly owing to interference from retrieval of incorrect
responses (Horner and Henson, 2011). This diﬀerence in the amount of
priming as a function of whether or not the response on second pre-
sentation is congruent with that on ﬁrst presentation – the “congruency
eﬀect” – is often used as the deﬁning signature of S-R bindings.
Neuroimaging data support the contribution of rapidly learnt S-R
bindings to performance on classiﬁcation tasks. Several fMRI studies in
healthy individuals have found that the decreased fMRI response fol-
lowing repetition of visual stimuli (“repetition suppression”, RS), which
has been associated with priming (Koutstaal et al., 2001; Schacter and
Buckner, 1998; Simons et al., 2003), is reduced when the classiﬁcation
task is reversed. This reduction in RS following response reversal has
been seen in lateral prefrontal regions commonly associated with re-
sponse selection, and occasionally in ventral temporal regions com-
monly associated with perceptual/conceptual component processes
(Dobbins et al., 2004; Horner and Henson, 2008; Race et al., 2009),
though is not readily apparent in MTL regions.
Given that a typical priming experiment entails tens if not hundreds
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of unique stimuli, the retrieval of the appropriate S-R binding when one
of those stimuli is repeated suggests that the brain has an impressive
capacity to store many such S-R bindings. To test whether this capacity
for rapid learning of multiple, unique S-R associations is supported by
MTL, Schnyer et al. (2006; Experiment 2) reported priming data from a
speeded classiﬁcation task on nine patients with MTL damage, together
with age-matched controls. Participants were initially asked to decide
“Is the object bigger than a shoebox?”, but then after one or three
presentations of each stimulus, the task reversed to “Is the object
smaller than a shoebox?”. Controls showed the usual reduction in RT
priming when the task was reversed, indicative of S-R bindings. RT
priming in the patients however showed no detectable eﬀect of the task
being reversed (see ahead to Fig. 3 for a re-plotting of Schnyer et al.'s
data). The authors therefore concluded that MTL regions are re-
sponsible for S-R learning.
Though MTL damage was “radiologically-veriﬁed” in each patient,
the extent of that damage was not reported by Schnyer et al. (2006), so
they were unable to conclude whether S-R bindings are supported
speciﬁcally by the hippocampus, or by other MTL regions like en-
torhinal, perirhinal or parahippocampal cortices. We recently reported
six patients whose MRI scans showed clear evidence of hippocampal
volume reduction, with little sign of gray-matter damage outside the
hippocampus (Henson et al., 2016). Our main aim in the present ex-
periment was therefore to determine whether the S-R deﬁcit reported
by Schnyer et al. is speciﬁc to hippocampal damage.
Our second aim was to test whether Schnyer et al.'s results gen-
eralise to a modiﬁed version of the object classiﬁcation task. Our
modiﬁed paradigm (initially proposed by Denkinger and Koutstaal
(2009) involves keeping the task constant (e.g, “Is the object bigger
than X?”), but changing the referent instead (i.e, X). This paradigm
simultaneously reverses all three levels of response representations in S-
R bindings that have been identiﬁed to date (Horner and Henson, 2011;
see also Schnyer et al., 2007; Dennis and Perfect, 2012). This is illu-
strated in Fig. 1, where the response associated with an object (e.g,
monkey) when it is judged to be bigger than a shoebox could include
the speciﬁc motor Action (e.g, right index ﬁnger press), the Decision
(e.g, “yes”/“no”) and/or the Classiﬁcation label (e.g, “bigger”/
“smaller”). Reversing the task, as done in the Schnyer et al. paradigm,
potentially disrupts the value of retrieving the previous Action and/or
Decision (i.e, disrupts S-A and/or S-D bindings), but retrieving the
previous Classiﬁcation label (e.g., “bigger”) could still help generate a
response (e.g, “no” to the reversed task of “smaller than a shoebox?”).
Note that we use to term “classiﬁcation” to refer to the binary category
label given to the object at Study (e.g., “bigger” or “smaller”); more
complex stimulus-task associations, or semantic information about the
objects, are also likely to contribute to priming in general, but are kept
constant in the current paradigm (see Discussion section for fuller
consideration of these issues). Indeed, it is possible that the residual
priming in Schnyer et al.’s reversal condition, which they attributed to
facilitation of perceptual/conceptual processes outside the MTL, actu-
ally reﬂected intact stimulus-classiﬁcation (S-C) bindings in their pa-
tients (despite impaired S-A and/or S-D bindings). On the other hand,
changing the referent, for example to a wheelie bin1 (Fig. 1), ad-
ditionally disrupts the value of retrieving a prior Classiﬁcation, as
shown by Horner and Henson (2009), and may therefore abolish any
priming in patients with hippocampal damage.
Furthermore, we can also test the type of stimulus representation in
S-R bindings by orthogonally varying whether or not the stimulus is
repeated in the same perceptual form (e.g, picture or word) as its initial
presentation. We previously showed evidence for two levels of stimulus
representation: a form-speciﬁc and more abstract representation
(Horner and Henson, 2011; see also Allenmark et al., 2015; though see
Schnyer et al., 2007). We included this “Within-format” versus “Across-
format” manipulation in the present experiment to test whether pa-
tients are similarly able to form S-R bindings that abstract away from
the precise stimulus form. Indeed, the present experiment is identical to
that in Experiment 1 of Horner and Henson (2011), except that we: 1)
tested older healthy controls and patients, rather than young controls,
2) made trials self-paced rather than running at a ﬁxed rate, to make the
task easier for patients (and older controls), who generally respond
slower and show greater variability, and 3) used two rather than three
presentations of each stimulus before the referent change, to try to
maintain the same total duration as our previous experiment.
More precisely, Experiment 1 conformed to a 2 × 3 × 2 factorial
design, with between-subject factor Group (N = 24 Controls vs N = 6
Patients) and within-subject factors: Study Condition (Within-format
Primed, Across-format Primed, Novel) and Congruency (Congruent,
Incongruent; see Methods section for how Novel trials were split into
Congruent and Incongruent conditions). Like Horner and Henson
(2011), we deﬁned priming in multiple ways, but focus on the pro-
portional measure ((Novel–Primed)/Novel) used by Schnyer et al.
(2006) to allow for the fact that patients tend to have longer overall RTs
than controls. Once priming scores have been calculated, the design
equates to a 2 (Group) × 2 (Format) × 2 (Congruency) factorial de-
sign. Based on Schnyer et al.'s ﬁndings, we expected an interaction
between Group and Congruency on the amount of priming, with con-
trols showing a greater eﬀect of congruency than patients. More spe-
ciﬁcally, we predicted that controls would show greater priming than
patients in Congruent trials (because controls but not patients beneﬁt
from S-R bindings), but comparable or even less priming than patients
for Incongruent trials (where controls would either ignore S-R bindings,
or experience interference from incompatible S-R bindings).
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Participants
The six patients were selected from the Cambridge Hippocampal
Panel, and are the same as those reported in Henson et al. (2016). The
study was approved by NRES Ethics Committee East of England (ref 12/
EE/0190) and written consent obtained according to the Declaration of
Helsinki. The patients were referred on the basis of reported memory
diﬃculties and, in some cases, a diagnostic MR scan that showed an
indication of limited MTL damage.
A summary of the patients is given in Table 1. The Z-scores for
verbal memory, visuospatial memory, verbal memory, visuospatial
skills and executive function are combined across multiple neu-
ropsychological tests (using Stouﬀer's method; see Henson et al., 2016,
for details and scores of precise tests). All patients were impaired in
verbal and/or visual memory: although the combined Z-score was not
signiﬁcant for P5, this was driven by intact recognition memory
(75–95th percentile for words; 50th percentile for faces), and when
restricted to recall tests, her memory varied from 10 to 25th percentile
for stories and 2–25th percentile for complex ﬁgures (see Henson et al.,
2016). The only non-memory impairment was executive function for P4
(see Supplementary Material for analyses with P4 excluded). All six
patients showed signiﬁcant reduction in hippocampal volume; two
showed additional reduction in entorhinal volume (P4 and P6) and two
showed additional reduction in parahippocampal volume (P2 and P6).
Whole-brain voxel-wise analysis did not reveal any signiﬁcant group
diﬀerences from age- and sex-matched controls outside the hippo-
campus (Henson et al., 2016).
Twenty-four control participants were recruited from the Volunteer
Panel of the Medical Research Council (MRC) Cognition and Brain
Sciences Unit (CBU). There was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the ages of
these controls (M = 60, range 50–72) and those of the patients (M =
58, range 39–66), in terms of the mean, t(28) = 0.54, p = 0.60, or the
1 Wheelie bin is a common term in the United Kingdom that refers to a large trash can
(with wheels), which has a standard size (approx 1 m× 0.6 m× 0.7 m; 240 l) that would
be well-known by our participants.
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variance, Levene's test, F(1,28) = 1.34, p = 0.26. Thirteen of the
control group were female, whereas only one patient was female, and
therefore analyses were also repeated with sex as a covariate. These
potential confounds were further addressed by reporting tests of each
individual patient versus the control group.
2.2. Materials
Stimuli were 384 coloured images of everyday objects and their
names, previously used by Horner and Henson (2009), split into two
groups, relating to the wheelie bin and pencil case referent change (192
stimuli per group). For the wheelie bin referent group, stimuli were
classiﬁed so that 25% were smaller than both a shoebox and a wheelie
bin (Congruent), 50% were bigger than a shoebox but smaller than a
wheelie bin (Incongruent) and 25% were bigger than both a shoebox
and a wheelie bin (Congruent). For the pencil case referent group, 25%
were smaller than a pencil case and a shoebox (Congruent), 50% were
bigger than a pencil case but smaller than a shoebox (Incongruent) and
25% were bigger than a pencil case and a shoebox (Congruent). This
resulted in 96 stimuli per Congruency condition for each referent group.
Stimuli within each of these Congruency groups were randomly as-
signed to one of three Study Condition groups, relating to whether they
were presented as a picture at Study (Within-format Primed), a word at
Study (Across-format Primed) or were experimentally Novel (Novel).
This resulted in 64 stimuli per each of the 3 conditions when collapsing
across the two referent changes. The assignment of stimuli to the three
Study Condition factors was rotated across control participants.
2.3. Procedure
Prior to the experiment, participants performed a practice session
using the “bigger-than-shoebox” task, where it was made clear that this
comparison referred to the object's typical size in real life. Participants
responded using a “yes” or “no” key with their right or left index ﬁnger
respectively, and were required to respond as quickly as possible
without compromising accuracy. Stimuli in the practice session were 10
objects (5 pictures, 5 words) that were not included in the main ex-
periment. Following the practice session, participants were shown
Bigger than a shoebox?
Monkey > Shoebox
“Bigger” = “Yes”
“Yes” = “Right Key”
Classification:
“Bigger”
Decision:
“Yes”
Action:
“Right”
Schnyer et al (2006)
Bigger than a Shoebox?
Classify: bigger
Decision: yes
Action: right
Bigger than a Pencil Case?
Bigger than a Wheelie Bin?
Congruent
Incongruent
Classify: bigger
Decision: yes
Action: right
Classify: smaller
Decision: no
Action: left
Fig. 1. Bottom Left: Schematic of possible response
representations (Classiﬁcations, Decisions and
Actions) that could be bound with a stimulus in a
classiﬁcation task. Reversing the task, e.g., from
“Bigger than a shoebox” to “Smaller than a shoebox”,
as in Schnyer et al. (2006), reverses the Decision and
Action, but not the Classiﬁcation. Top Right: Chan-
ging the referent (e.g, from a shoebox to a wheelie
bin), on the other hand, reverses all three levels of
response representation.
Table 1
Summary of patients. Neuropsychological scores are combined Z-values, based on norms; Hippocampal volumes are reported as T-values relative to age- and sex-matched controls (with
% of control volume in brackets) from Henson et al. (2016). Executive function was collapsed across digit-symbol, forward digit span, backward digit-span and the Brixton test. For
Anxiety/Depression, the “Mild” label is based on HADS score of 9 in both cases; “None” means score< 8. Missing data indicated by hyphen. For further details, see Henson et al. (2016).
Parahipp = Parahippocampal. * = p<0.05, two-tailed; ~ = p<0.05, one-tailed.
Patient P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6
Age (years) 57 39 66 66 57 62
Gender Male Male Male Male Female Male
Education < 12 14 12+ Apprentice 14+ 14+ 12+ Apprentice
(years)
Presenting diagnosis Limbic encephalitis Carbon monoxide Carbon monoxide Limbic encephalitis Limbic encephalitis Limbic encephalitis
History of symptoms (years) -, 1 20 18 6 6 14, 4
NART IQ 91 112 123 118 121 111
Verbal Memory (Z) −3.31* −2.68* −2.68* −4.03* −0.48 −3.12*
Visuospatial Memory (Z) −3.82* −2.87* −2.42* −3.82* −1.59 −0.91
Verbal Skills (Z) −1.37 +0.14 +1.39 +1.44 +0.29 +0.99
Visuospatial Skills (Z) −0.54 +2.97 +2.40 −0.88 +1.24 +1.45
Executive Function (Z) −0.76 +1.37 +0.26 −3.12* +1.21 +0.21
Anxiety / Depression Mild – None None None Mild
Hippocampal −5.07 −4.81 −3.32 −1.80 −3.95 −4.97
Volume (T) (46)* (57)* (58)* (79)~ (67)* (50)*
Entorhinal −1.76 −1.59 −0.85 −2.93 −0.97 −3.67
Volume (T) (79) (79) (88) (61)* (85) (52)*
Parahipp. −0.13 −2.52 +1.07 −2.01 +0.18 −3.12
Volume (T) (98) (70)* (112) (76) (102) (62)*
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example photos of each object referent (i.e., shoebox, wheelie bin,
pencil case) and were asked to report the average size of each referent.
The experiment consisted of four alternating study-test cycles (two
relating to the wheelie bin referent change and two relating to the
pencil case referent change) with each cycle lasting approximately
15 min. There was minimal break between cycles (typically just 10 s of
seconds), to minimize the chance that participants forgot the instruc-
tions. During each study phase, 64 stimuli were shown two times re-
sulting in 128 trials. 32 stimuli were presented as pictures (Within-
format) and 32 were presented as words (Across-format). Words were
presented in black on a white background with the same pixel dimen-
sions as the pictures. Each set of 32 stimuli consisted of equal numbers
of Congruent and Incongruent items. Apart from ensuring no immediate
repetitions, the stimulus presentation order was randomized.
Participants were always asked “is the object bigger than a shoebox?” at
Study.
During each Test phase, the 64 stimuli from the Study phase
(Within-format and Across-format) were randomly intermixed with 32
new stimuli (Novel). All items at Test were presented as pictures.
Participants were either asked “is the object bigger than a wheelie bin?”
or “is the object bigger than a pencil case?”. The order of task (i.e., type
of reference object) was counterbalanced across participants in an
ABBA/BAAB manner. When combined with the 3 stimulus sets, this
meant 6 diﬀerent counterbalancings (though owing to an experimenter
error, only 5 of the 6 counterbalancings were used for the patients, with
patients P1 and P3 having the same stimulus assignment). Throughout
every trial during both Study and Test, the current task/reference was
displayed at the top of the screen, so participants were unlikely to
forget.
Each trial consisted of a 500 ms ﬁxation cross followed by a stimulus
that remained onscreen until the participant responded, followed by a
blank screen for 200 ms. A response was required before the next trial
started (i.e, the task was self-paced).
2.4. Analyses
Trials with RTs less than 400 ms, or two or more standard devia-
tions above or below a participant's mean for a given task, were ex-
cluded from the RT analyses (also rendering the RT distributions more
Gaussian). Given that there is some subjectivity in determining whether
an object is bigger than a shoebox, wheelie bin or pencil case, errors
were deﬁned by a diﬀerence from the modal response for each object
across participants in the Horner and Henson (2011) study.
Note that for Novel stimuli, “congruency” refers to whether the
correct response for the “bigger”/“smaller” task would be the same or
diﬀerent for the study-task referent as for the test-task referent, even
though participants never actually classiﬁed Novel items according to
the study-task referent. Therefore the subtraction of Novel RTs from
Repeated RTs for Congruent and Incongruent conditions separately
means that priming eﬀects were not confounded by item diﬀerences
owing to how “close” in size each object was to the relevant referent
(see Horner and Henson, 2011, for further details and analyses).
Error rates and RTs for correct trials at Test constituted the main
dependent variables. Given the focus on S-R eﬀects, RTs were further
restricted to objects also given a correct judgment on both occurrences
at Study. These variables were subjected to repeated-measures analyses
of variance (ANOVAs). Only ANOVA eﬀects that survived an alpha of
0.05 were reported, and unless stated otherwise, t-tests were two-tailed.
Two ANOVAs were performed: 1) a two-way ANOVA on Novel
trials, with factors Group (Controls vs Patients) and Congruency
(Congruent vs Incongruent), and 2) a three-way ANOVA on priming
scores, with factors Group, Congruency and Format Match (Within vs
Across format, ie whether items depicted as Pictures at Test had been
seen as Pictures or Words respectively at Study). Because of potential
diﬀerences in Congruent and Incongruent Novel RTs (as tested by the
ﬁrst ANOVA), as well as longer RTs for the Patient group than Control
group, the two-way ANOVAs on RT priming scores were performed for
three deﬁnitions of priming: subtractive, proportional and Z-scored.
Subtractive priming is simply the diﬀerence in RTs for Repeated vs.
Novel stimuli (Novel–Repeated); proportional priming is the diﬀerence
in RTs for Repeated vs. Novel stimuli divided by Novel RTs
((Novel–Repeated)/Novel), calculated for each participant; Z-scored
priming is obtained by taking each participant's condition means,
subtracting their overall mean, and dividing by the standard deviation
of their condition means (Faust et al., 1999). However, we focus on the
proportional priming results because this was the measure used by
Schnyer et al. (2006), and report subtractive and Z-scored priming in
the Supplementary Material.
To ease comparison with Schnyer et al. (2006; Table 3), but in
minor departures from Horner and Henson (2011; Table 1), we report
standard errors rather than standard deviations, and express propor-
tional priming in terms of %.
Table 2
Mean percentage errors and reaction times (RTs), with standard errors in parentheses, for Within-format, Across-format and Novel conditions of Experiment 1, plus error priming,
(subtractive) RT priming and proportional RT priming (% Priming) as a function of Congruency (Con, Inc). Note that for Novel stimuli, “congruency” refers to whether the correct
response for the “bigger”/“smaller” task would be the same or diﬀerent for the study-task referent as for the test-task referent, even though participants never actually classiﬁed Novel
items according to the study-task referent.
Condition/Congruency Within-format (Picture-Picture) Across-format (Word-Picture) Novel
Con Inc Con Inc Con Inc
Controls (N = 24)
% Errors 5.67 (0.80) 13.9 (1.44) 5.13 (0.92) 14.6 (1.56) 5.04 (0.76) 14.4 (1.36)
Error Priming −0.63 (0.70) 0.5 (1.07) −0.08 (0.71) −0.17 (0.98)
Patients (N = 6)
% Errors 4.33 (0.88) 17.3 (3.16) 4.67 (0.95) 14.3 (2.75) 4.17 (1.38) 15.8 (2.73)
Error Priming −0.17 (1.78) −1.50 (3.02) −0.50 (1.61) 1.50 (1.61)
Controls (N = 24)
RTs 814 (29) 1034 (48) 882 (35) 1113 (56) 916 (38) 1044 (46)
RT Priming 103 (18) 10 (23) 34 (15) −69 (25)
RT % Priming 10.4 (1.47) 0.62 (2.09) 3.23 (1.45) −6.38 (2.12)
Patients (N = 6)
RTs 1433 (480) 2076 (669) 1636 (490) 2388 (923) 1725 (642) 1889 (564)
RT Priming 292 (168) −187 (110) 88 (160) −499 (361)
RT % Priming 12.8 (4.54) −7.59 (2.71) −2.10 (4.76) −15.5 (7.95)
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3. Results
3.1. Errors
The percentages of errors are shown in Table 2 (note that “errors” in
this subjective size judgment are deﬁned relative to the modal response;
see Methods). The error rate in controls was very similar to those in
Table 1 of Horner and Henson (2011), even though the present controls
were considerably older. The error rate in controls was also comparable
for congruent trials to that in Schnyer et al. (4.6%), but was numerically
higher for incongruent trials than in Schnyer et al.’s reversed condition
(7.2%). The latter likely reﬂects the additional interference from re-
versing S-C bindings in the present paradigm but not in the Schnyer
et al. paradigm. The error rate for patients in the present study was very
similar to that in controls, suggesting that the patients could perform
the task at a similar level. This contrasts with the patients in the
Schnyer et al. study, who made more errors (11.5% and 10.2% for
maintained versus reversed tasks respectively) than their controls for
both tasks.
The 2 × 2 ANOVA on error rates in Novel conditions showed only a
signiﬁcant main eﬀect of Congruency, F(1,28) = 41.7, p< 0.001,
which reﬂected more errors in the Incongruent than Congruent condi-
tion. This was expected, since these items tend to be closer to the re-
ferents and hence more ambiguous, and illustrates the importance of
having separate Novel baselines with which to measure priming. There
was no signiﬁcant eﬀect of Group (Controls vs Patients), nor interaction
between Group and Congruency, F(1,28)’s< 1.
The 2 × 2× 2 ANOVA on subtractive priming in error rates showed
no signiﬁcant eﬀects or interactions between Format Match,
Congruency and Group, F(1,28)’s< 2.88, p's> 0.10. These results
suggest that the RT priming eﬀects below are unlikely to reﬂect a speed-
accuracy trade-oﬀ.
The results of the same analyses repeated with sex as a covariate
were very similar (see Supplementary Material).
3.2. Reaction times
In additional to the errors described above, we excluded another
12% of trials in the Control group and 8% in the Patient group with
outlying RTs in Test trials or inconsistent responses across Study trials
(see Methods). The average number of remaining (correct) trials per
condition was 50 (min = 21, max = 62) for controls and 53 (min = 35,
max = 63) for patients. As expected, the present controls were slower
(Table 2) than their younger counterparts in Table 1 of Horner and
Henson (2011), which might explain why their subtractive priming
scores were slightly larger, though their proportional priming scores
were more comparable. Patients were slower still (than the present
controls), though there was large variability across patients (see
Supplementary Table 1 for scores for each patient). Nonetheless, pro-
portional priming was similar in size to the controls, if slightly more
extreme (Fig. 2).
The 2×2 ANOVA on Novel conditions showed a signiﬁcant main
eﬀect of Congruency, F(1,28) = 21.2, p< 0.001, which reﬂected
longer RTs in the Incongruent than Congruent condition, as expected
(and paralleling the increased error rate reported above). There was
also a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of Group, F(1,28) = 7.81, p<0.01, which
reﬂected longer RTs in patients than controls. There was no evidence
for an interaction between Congruency and Group, F(1,28)< 1. The
slower RTs to Novel items for both Incongruent relative to Congruent
conditions, and for patients relative to controls, reinforces the im-
portance of measuring priming by proportional means below.
3.2.1. Proportional priming
The 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA on proportional priming showed a sig-
niﬁcant main eﬀect of Congruency, F(1,28) = 23.2, p< ; .001, with
positive priming (response speeding) for Congruent conditions and
negative priming (response slowing) for Incongruent conditions, to-
gether with a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of Format Match, F(1,28) = 30.5,
p< 0.001, with more positive priming within formats rather than
across formats, as expected. Unlike Horner and Henson (2011), any
interaction between Congruency and Format Match did not reach sig-
niﬁcance, F(1,28)< 1. There was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of Group, F
(1,28) = 4.38, p<0.05, with patients showing more negative priming
scores on average (see Fig. 2). Interestingly, there was no evidence for
an interaction between Group and Congruency, F(1,28) = 1.55, p =
0.224, nor for an interaction between Group and Format Match, F(1,28)
= 1.43, p = 0.241, nor for the three-way interaction, F(1,28) = 1.24, p
= 0.274. These results suggest that patients exhibit similar propor-
tional priming eﬀects as controls, i.e, were equally sensitive to S-R ef-
fects (see also Bayes Factor analyses below). Indeed, if anything, the
numerical size of the mean congruency eﬀect on priming (averaged
across Format Match) was larger, rather than smaller, in the Patient
group (M = 16.9%) than Control group (M = 9.72%).
The signiﬁcance of proportional priming eﬀects in each of the four
conditions separately is illustrated in Fig. 2 (error bars are 95% con-
ﬁdence intervals). Like the young controls in Horner and Henson
(2011), the present older controls showed signiﬁcant positive priming
in the two Congruent conditions, and signiﬁcant negative priming in
the Incongruent Across-format condition. The patients showed sig-
niﬁcant positive priming in the Congruent Within-format condition, but
not the Congruent Across-format condition. The patients also showed
negative priming, though this only reached signiﬁcance in the Within-
format Incongruent condition (p = 0.054 for the Across-format In-
congruent condition). Thus not only was there no evidence from the
previous ANOVA that the pattern of priming diﬀered across groups, but
there were cases of both positive and negative priming that were sig-
niﬁcant even when the patient group was considered on its own.
The same pattern of signiﬁcant eﬀects was seen when using either
Subtractive Priming or Z-scored Priming (see Methods), or when sex
was covaried out, as shown in Supplementary Material. One patient
(P3) showed particularly long RTs (Supplementary Table 1), so to fur-
ther check that results were not driven by this patient, we repeated the
ANOVA on proportional priming without P3. There was still no two-
way interaction between Congruency and Group, and the congruency
eﬀect was still numerically larger in the Patient group (see
Supplementary Material). Finally, to more closely match the Schnyer
et al. paradigm, we repeated the ANOVA on our Within-Format con-
ditions only, but again found no evidence of a smaller Congruency ef-
fect in patients than controls (see Supplementary Material).
We conducted various additional analyses to conﬁrm the
Fig. 2. Proportional Priming for each condition and group. Cong = Congruent; Incon =
Incongruent. Error bars are one-tailed 95% conﬁdence intervals, one-tailed, given the
prior patterns in Horner and Henson (2011). For individual patient data, see Fig. 3 and
Supplementary Material.
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signiﬁcance of the proportional priming results.
3.2.2. Nonparametric tests
Given that the patient group only had 6 members, while the control
group had 24, it is diﬃcult to assess the homogeneity of variance as-
sumed by the above (parameteric) ANOVAs. We therefore performed
non-parametric, Wilcoxon ranksum tests on proportional priming
scores, separately for each of the within-group eﬀects of 1) Congruency,
2) Format Match and 3) Congruency-by-Format-Match interaction.
When combining both groups, there were signiﬁcant main eﬀects of
Congruency, ranksum = 427, p<0.001, and Format Match, ranksum
= 437, p< 0.001, but no interaction between these two factors,
ranksum = 281, p = 0.32. When comparing the two groups however,
there was no evidence for any interaction between Group and any of
these three eﬀects, ranksums<346, p's> 0.19.
3.2.3. Individual patient tests
In case of important diﬀerences between the six patients, we also
compared the congruency eﬀect in each patient separately against the
control group, using a T-test with pooled variance (sometimes called
Crawford's Test). When averaging across Format Match, only one pa-
tient was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from controls (Supplementary Table 2),
which was P3, who was the patient who showed longer RTs in total (see
ANOVA above with P3 excluded). Importantly, this patient actually
showed a greater eﬀect of congruency on priming than the controls
(i.e., not the smaller eﬀect reported by Schnyer et al.). The same pattern
of signiﬁcant results obtained when analysing the Within-format con-
dition only, to closer match the Schnyer et al. study, with only P3
showing a signiﬁcantly greater congruency eﬀect than controls
(Supplementary Table 2). Given that the precise way to adjust priming
scores by overall RTs is a matter of debate (Faust et al., 1999), we do
not pursue this further, but simply note that individual analyses provide
no support for the hypothesis that hippocampal lesions reduce the in-
ﬂuence of S-R bindings, and group analyses show that our results are
not overly inﬂuenced by the patient with exceptionally long RTs.
3.2.4. Bayes factor
The lack of a signiﬁcant two-way interaction between Congruency
and Group suggests that the congruency eﬀect, as an index of S-R
bindings, is comparable in our patients compared to our controls. To
provide more evidence for this conclusion, rather than relying on
failure to reject the null hypothesis that the two groups diﬀer, we cal-
culated the Bayes Factor for the likelihood of patients showing the same
size congruency eﬀect as controls (alternate hypothesis), relative to the
likelihood of patients showing no congruency eﬀect (null hypothesis;
Dienes, 2011). Given the congruency eﬀect for proportional priming
(averaged across format) had a mean of 19.4% and standard deviation
of 21.4% in controls, and a mean of 33.8% and standard deviation of
38.7% in patients, the Bayes Factor was 5.09, which provides “sub-
stantial” (Jeﬀreys, 1961) evidence for the hypothesis that controls and
patients show the same size congruency eﬀect.
3.2.5. Comparison with Schnyer et al. (2006)
For direct comparison with Experiment 2 of Schnyer et al. (2006), we
re-plotted the proportional priming scores from their study together with
those from the present study. We took data from their Block 1, and from
our Within-Format conditions, since these are the most comparable
conditions. The results are shown in Fig. 3. The main diﬀerence for the
controls is that the Incongruent condition abolished priming in the
present study, but not the Schnyer et al. study, consistent with our claim
that the present design reverses multiple levels of response representa-
tion, including Stimulus-Classiﬁcation bindings, which are not reversed
in the Inverted condition of Schnyer et al. More importantly, reversing
multiple levels of response representation also reduced priming in all six
of the present patients, unlike the patients in the Schnyer et al. study,
who showed no eﬀect of decision and action reversal.
4. Discussion
We fully expected, based on Schnyer et al. (2006), that individuals
with hippocampal damage would show reduced evidence of stimulus-
response (S-R) bindings. S-R bindings were indexed by the eﬀect of
congruency on RT priming, which reﬂects the diﬀerence in priming
when the response is reversed between initial and repeated stimulus
presentations, relative to when it is maintained. Our expectations were
not conﬁrmed however, in that we found that the evidence favoured the
null hypothesis of equivalently-sized congruency eﬀects in patients and
controls, and the patients clearly showed signiﬁcant congruency eﬀects,
no matter how we measured them. This ﬁnding is surprising, because
according to many theories, the hippocampus would seem to be a cri-
tical brain structure for rapid learning (from just 1–2 presentations) of
novel and arbitrary S-R bindings.
We start by considering possible reasons for the discrepancy be-
tween the Schnyer et al. (2006) study and the present study, before
discussing other ﬁndings and the broader implications of our study.
4.1. Possible diﬀerences from Schnyer et al. (2006)
One possible diﬀerence between the present study and that of
Schnyer et al. (2006) concerns the type of patients. For example, the
patients tested by Schnyer et al. (2006) may have had more severe or
extensive lesions of hippocampus, such that a threshold for observing
reduced S-R bindings was exceeded. A direct comparison is not possible
because Schnyer et al. (2006) were unable to report details of the extent
of hippocampal damage. However it is noteworthy that the average,
bilateral gray-matter volume loss in hippocampus was 40% in the
present cases, which is comparable to other studies of acquired hip-
pocampal damage in human adults. Moreover, all six of the present
cases showed marked impairment on at least one standardised neu-
ropsychological test of memory (though unfortunately, these were dif-
ferent tests from those used by Schnyer et al., so again, direct com-
parison is diﬃcult). Thus while we cannot refute the possibility that the
patients in the Schnyer et al. study had greater hippocampal damage
and more severe amnesia, the present hippocampal lesions were suﬃ-
ciently severe to impair episodic memory, and so it remains interesting
that there was no corresponding impairment detected on S-R binding.
Another possibility is that the extent of damage outside the hippo-
campus was greater in Schnyer et al.'s patients; for example, spreading
into surrounding perirhinal cortex. Perirhinal cortex may play a role in
binding stimuli and responses, given evidence that this region supports
not only representations of complex visual objects, but also the en-
coding of object-context associations (Watson et al., 2012). If the pa-
tients in Schnyer et al.’s study had greater perirhinal damage, then they
would show stronger evidence of impairment of S-R bindings. One
problem for this perirhinal account however is the ﬁnding reported by
Wang et al. (2010). These authors compared priming for patients with
hippocampal lesions against priming for patients with larger MTL le-
sions, using the same object-size judgment task as used here and by
Schnyer et al. (2006) (though on words at both study and test). Wang
et al. did not manipulate response congruency, so S-R bindings were
likely to contribute to their priming measure. While their hippocampal
group showed priming (consistent with the priming found in the con-
gruent conditions of the present study and of Schnyer et al.), their MTL
group did not show signiﬁcant priming, which Wang et al. attributed to
impaired conceptual processing in perirhinal cortex (based on addi-
tional fMRI data). If the Wang et al. results hold, then the fact that
Schnyer et al.'s patients did show signiﬁcant priming suggests that they
did not have signiﬁcant perirhinal damage.
Another possibility is that the key region of damage in the Schnyer
et al. (2006) patients but not present patients is entorhinal cortex. This
would be consistent with lesion work in non-human primates that has
investigated rapid learning of arbitrary visuo-motor mappings (visuo-
motor learning, VML), which resemble S-R bindings. Although initial
R.N. Henson et al. Neuropsychologia 103 (2017) 106–114
111
work using aspiration lesions of the hippocampus plus underlying
cortex, including caudal entorhinal cortex, indicated that these regions
were critical (Murray and Wise, 1996; Murray and Mishkin, 1998),
subsequent research using more precise, reversible inactivation via in-
tracerebral infusion of a GABA agonist found that hippocampus was not
essential for VML; rather entorhinal cortex was key (Yang et al., 2014;
Murray and Mishkin, 1998). Only 2 of the 6 patients in the present
study (P4 and P6) had signiﬁcant entorhinal volume loss detectable
from MRI (compared to all 6 for hippocampal volume loss, Henson
et al., 2016). When testing individually, there was no evidence that P4
or P6 showed reduced congruency eﬀects, though one should be wary
of null results in single cases. Note that, even if the presence or absence
of entorhinal damage does reconcile results across the two studies, the
present study would still be correct in concluding that hippocampus
proper is not necessary for S-R bindings.
Other NHP studies have shown that the fornix is also critical for
VML (Brasted et al., 2005), yet diﬀusion-weighted MRI showed that the
present group of 6 patients also had signiﬁcant white matter abnorm-
alities of the fornix, in addition to their hippocampal damage (Henson
et al., 2016). Thus the relationship between the neural correlates of S-R
bindings in humans and neural correlates of VML in non-human pri-
mates requires further investigation.
A ﬁnal anatomical possibility is that the patients in Schnyer et al.’s
study (but not those in the present study) also had damage to basal
ganglia circuits that support many types of motor/habit learning (e.g.,
Gabrieli, 1998; Poldrack et al., 2001). However, motor (procedural)
learning is conventionally thought to be more gradual (i.e., incremental
over many trials) than the type of S-R learning occurring here; a point
we return to later.
A second dimension along which the two studies diﬀer concerns the
paradigm. We reversed response contingencies by changing the referent
of the size judgment task, rather than reversing the direction of the size
judgment. As explained in the Introduction, the reason for this change
was that we have previously shown (Horner and Henson, 2009, 2011)
that a referent change additionally invalidates any bindings between
the stimulus and the “classiﬁcation” response (i.e., the label “bigger” or
“smaller”), so the present referent change arguably induces a more
comprehensive disruption of the use of S-R bindings. This could explain
why priming was completely abolished in the present Incongruent
(Within Format) condition, whereas it remained signiﬁcant (though
reduced) in the corresponding (Inverted) condition of the Schnyer et al.
(2006) study. Indeed, the use of Stimulus-Classiﬁcation (S-C) bindings
might be the cause of this residual priming in Schnyer et al.’s data,
rather than a residual conceptual/perceptual processing component.
Nonetheless, it remains possible that reversing the task instructions has
a qualitatively diﬀerent eﬀect (e.g, in terms of task switching, Henson
et al., 2016) from changing the referent; more speciﬁc hypotheses
would be needed to test this.
Another diﬀerence between the two paradigms concerns the
number of study presentations (before the task or referent is changed).
Schnyer et al. used both a single presentation (their Low Prime condi-
tion) and three presentations (their High Prime condition), whereas we
used two presentations. One possibility is that two study repetitions
were suﬃcient for non-hippocampal S-R learning (e.g., via basal
ganglia). However, this is contrary to the eﬀect that the number of
presentations had on Schnyer et al.'s results: Although they did not
analyse their High and Low conditions separately, the numerical pat-
tern for their single presentation condition actually showed little eﬀect
of task reversal in Block 1 for either patients or controls; it was only
after three presentations that Schnyer et al. observed a greater task
reversal cost in controls than patients. Thus another way to reconcile
the two studies is to propose that the diﬀerence between patients and
controls only emerges after three or more presentations. In other words,
three presentations may be necessary for controls to form an explicit
representation of an S-R contingency in the hippocampus. However,
this is the opposite to 1) conventional views that the hippocampus
supports one-shot learning, and that other (eg basal ganglia) systems
support more gradual, procedural learning (Gabrieli, 1998), and 2)
other studies in healthy controls, which found only quantitative rather
than qualitative eﬀects of a small number of repetitions on S-R learning
(e.g., Horner and Henson, 2009; Dennis and Perfect, 2012).
A ﬁnal possibility is that the discrepant results across the two stu-
dies reﬂect statistical artefacts. It is possible that our failure to ﬁnd an
interaction between controls vs patients and congruent vs incongruent
Fig. 3. Comparison of proportional priming eﬀects in current
study with that of Schnyer et al. (2006; Experiment 2) for Con-
gruent (Con) and Incongruent (Inc) trials. The open bars are data
replotted from Block 1 of Schnyer et al., for their Low Primed (1
study trial, e.g, “Con(1)”) and High Primed (3 study trials, e.g,
“Con(3)”) conditions (N = 12 controls and N = 9 patients; no SD
data provided); the blue horizontal lines and error bars are means
and 95% one-tailed conﬁdence intervals from the Within Format
condition of the present study (N = 24 controls and N = 6 pa-
tients), after adjusting for sex. Data from the six patients (P1-P6)
from the present study are also plotted separately. (For inter-
pretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the
reader is referred to the web version of this article).
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conditions was a type II error (given that we only tested 6 patients,
whereas Schnyer et al. tested 9). However, our Bayes Factor analysis
favours the null hypothesis of no interaction. Moreover, the three-way
interaction between Group, Cue (Congruency) and Condition (Number
of Repetitions) was not actually signiﬁcant in Schnyer et al.'s study
either; their main claim was based on the fact that their Control group
showed a signiﬁcant Cue-by-Condition interaction, but their Patient
group did not. Thus it is also possible that Schnyer et al.'s failure to ﬁnd
evidence for S-R bindings in the patients was a type II error (whereas
here, all 6 of the patients showed evidence of S-R bindings). Ultimately,
a direct replication of Schnyer et al.'s paradigm is necessary to resolve
the apparent discrepancies with the current paradigm.
4.2. Further ﬁndings
We introduced the within- versus across-format manipulation to test
whether hippocampal lesions would aﬀect the ability to generalise S-R
bindings across stimulus codes, as well as across response codes. Unlike
our previous study in young controls (Horner and Henson, 2011), we
failed to ﬁnd evidence of a greater eﬀect of congruency in the within-
than across-format conditions (i.e, no signiﬁcant interaction between
Congruency and Format Match on proportional priming). Thus there
was no evidence in the present study of format-speciﬁc stimulus codes.
Nonetheless, the congruency eﬀect was signiﬁcant in the Across-Format
conditions alone, F(1,28) = 12.5, p< 0.001 (with no evidence of an
interaction with Group, F(1,28)< 1), indicating that S-R bindings
generalised across the format of word versus picture. One might note
that priming in the Congruent Across-Format condition was not sig-
niﬁcant for the patients, as it was for controls (see Fig. 2). However, this
cannot be used to conclude that hippocampal lesions disrupt abstract
stimulus codes, because there was no evidence that proportional
priming in the Across-Format condition was smaller in patients than
controls, T(28) = 1.07, p = 0.29, and the lack of signiﬁcant priming in
the patient group alone could simply reﬂect low power. Moreover, S-R
bindings are indexed by the Congruency eﬀect (i.e, Congruent vs In-
congruent); direct comparisons between groups for single conditions
(e.g, the Congruent Across-Format condition), even if they were reli-
able, could reﬂect group diﬀerences in mechanisms other than S-R
bindings, such as the facilitation of semantic component processes.
While we think it is important that our changing referent paradigm
reverses all three levels of response representation currently known
(Horner and Henson, 2009), e.g. in order to address the possibility that
the patients in the Schnyer et al. (2006) study were still using stimulus-
classiﬁcation (S-C) bindings, we cannot reject the possibility that the
congruency eﬀects in the changing referent paradigm are driven by one
type of response code alone (rather than all three). For example,
priming in this paradigm might be dominated by stimulus-action (S-A)
bindings. This is important because our ﬁndings would then also be
consistent with the possibility that hippocampal lesions do not aﬀect S-
A bindings (producing congruency eﬀects comparable to controls in the
present paradigm), but do aﬀect stimulus-decision (S-D) and/or S-C
bindings (that are just not detectable in the present paradigm). Indeed,
in this case, it is further possible that the Schnyer et al. (2006) paradigm
is, for some reason, dominated instead by S-D bindings, such that an
eﬀect of hippocampal lesions is seen in that paradigm. While we have
no evidence for such a diﬀerence between paradigms when we have
used both (see Horner and Henson, 2009), testing these possibilities
would require further experiments in patients that dissect the diﬀerent
levels of response codes in S-R bindings, like the experiments in Horner
and Henson (2009).
Another important consideration concerns the possible role of
Stimulus-Task (S-T) bindings (Henson et al., 2014). While S-T bindings
are normally conceived at the abstract level of task (e.g, size judgments
versus animacy judgments), it is possible that S-T bindings are formed
that are speciﬁc to the referent (e.g, associating a picture of a monkey
with a “Bigger_Than_Shoebox” task label, rather than just “Bigger”
classiﬁcation label). While such S-T bindings could not cause the pre-
sent congruency eﬀect, because the referent changes in both Congruent
and Incongruent conditions (see Fig. 1), they could contribute to the
congruency eﬀect reported (in Controls) by Schyner et al. (2006),
where S-T bindings would change in the Incongruent but not Congruent
condition. Thus if hippocampal lesions aﬀect such speciﬁc S-T bindings,
this could explain why the patients in Schnyer et al. did not show a
congruency eﬀect. If these lesions did not aﬀect other types of S-R
bindings (e.g, S-D or S-A bindings), then this could further explain why
patients did show a congruency eﬀect in the present study, though it
would remain unclear why the integrity of such other S-R bindings did
not also cause a congruency eﬀect in the Schnyer et al. study. We hope
that future researchers will investigate the importance of the various
diﬀerences that we listed above between our study and Schnyer et al.'s,
including running direct replications of both studies.
4.3. Implications
We think that evidence for S-R bindings, like that presented here,
implies an impressive ability of the human brain to rapidly learn a large
number of S-R mappings. Of course, we do not know that an S-R
binding was formed or retrieved for every trial in the experiment – it is
possible that only a small fraction of trials in which S-R retrieval oc-
curred was suﬃcient to cause the average RT priming eﬀects – but at
the other extreme, the implication is that the brain can store hundreds
of unique mappings. So if the hippocampus is not the brain structure
that supports this impressive feat, which brain region is?
As mentioned above, one possibility is the surrounding entorhinal or
perirhinal cortex, consistent with the animal lesions studies using the
VML task, while another possibility is basal ganglia structures, which
have previously been associated with procedural learning (though
normally associated with more gradual learning, they may be able to
learn enough from 1 to 2 stimulus-response pairings to produce a de-
tectable eﬀect on RTs). A third possibility, not considered above, is that
S-R bindings are mediated by prefrontal regions. This would be con-
sistent with human fMRI and M/EEG studies of S-R retrieval, which
implicate ventral prefrontal regions in particular (e.g., Horner and
Henson, 2008; 2012; Race et al., 2009; Wig et al., 2009). It would also
be consistent with evidence that ventral (and orbital) prefrontal lesions
in animals impair VML (Bussey et al., 2001). It would therefore be in-
teresting to run the present paradigm in human patients with prefrontal
lesions, where signiﬁcantly smaller congruency eﬀects would be pre-
dicted.
Theoretically, S-R bindings may not conform to the type of ﬂexible
associations attributed to hippocampus (Cohen et al., 1997); associa-
tions that can be voluntarily retrieved and inter-related (e.g, to make
transitive inferences across associations). While S-R bindings are clearly
complex, encoding several types of response representations (Horner
and Henson, 2009) and relatively abstract stimulus representations (as
shown by the congruency eﬀect in the present Across Format condi-
tions), they may be relatively inﬂexible, in the sense of being retrieved
automatically and independently. A related possibility is that S-R
bindings are not represented explicitly, in the sense of participants
being aware of them, which is why hippocampus is not involved. While
we cannot rule out the possibility that both controls and patients had
episodic memories for some trials (those in which S-R bindings were
formed), the fact that S-R bindings co-occur with impairments on
standard tests of episodic (explicit) memory in the present patients
suggests that S-R bindings are more likely to be implicit (see also Giesen
and Rothermund, 2015). In short, the inﬂexible, involuntary and/or
implicit nature of S-R bindings may indicate a non-hippocampal locus;
but nonetheless a locus that allows rapid encoding of multiple arbitrary
mappings. This reinforces the point that it is theoretically important to
understand not only what individuals with amnesia cannot to, but also
what they can do (Clark and Maguire, 2016).
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